Europe: to be or not to be

That's the way it is with democracy that every now and then a "change of guard" takes place, and only with that change can new ideas and new dynamics in the operation of institutions and the political structures they create be expected. The moment of this new opening in the EU has long been delayed. The Community itself is in a lamentable state, and external challenges – if ignored or inefficiently taken up – can definitively push the Union to the periphery of global politics.

In-depth integration – defence of the status quo

If we are to defend the unity of the Union, to defend it from the problems caused by the divisions recently so strongly evident in many dimensions, we must recognise that for a time we have reached a wall as far as further deepening of integration is concerned. During the last two decades we have been witnesses to and participants in a great expansion of the Union: from 12 states in 1994 to 28 today. On the other hand, beginning with the Maastricht Treaty the Union has seen great progress in in-depth integration. Superimposed, the two processes are currently the source of many tensions and rifts, with the Eurozone crisis being their most spectacular symptom. In the broadest sense, not all the countries and communities of the EU are ready to keep up the pace initiated in Maastricht and continued in Lisbon. An attempt at crossing the border and escaping forward in certain significant matters will result in opposition that could bring about the emergence of serious decentralising movements, reaching even as far as disintegration. The potential opting out of the United Kingdom –"Brexit" – could only prove the beginning of the end of the Union as we know it.

A slowdown of integration or rethinking of its logic seems necessary, especially in two dimensions. First, in the incremental growth of new regulations proposed by the Commission. An excess of regulations in various fields not only stunts creativity and development but also leads to a self-fuelling bureaucratic centralism. This not only aggravates the deficit of democratic legitimation but also reduces the efficiency of sensible management of affairs that the organs of the EU were appointed for (the competency barrier). We know a somewhat different face of this problem from the days of real socialism. The subsidiarity principle calls for respect here. For "more Europe" does not after all mean "more Brussels". This border cannot currently be moved further without a revolt of the national authorities.

Secondly, the organs of the EU should refrain from the cultural homogenisation of Europe. Acting in the spirit of such homogenisation goes against "unity in diversity", the wise and yet not always respected treaty-ensconced motto of the European Union. What is common is the civilisational foundation of the EU without which its establishment would have been impossible. And that foundation should be respected rather than provoking its erosion. The European Community developed so as to put an end to wars in Europe and so that its nations could develop in peace in a manner consistent with the principles of democracy, the free market, fundamental rights, and human liberties. Yet it was not set up to invent "a new European" in Strasbourg or Brussels. The well-known adage of an Italian politician "We created Italy, now it is time to create Italians" is as graceful as untrue. Italy would not have begun if Italians, who had been there beforehand and who had been the authors of the Risorgimento, did not want it. And those from Sicily are still very different from those from Milan. The saying, therefore, should not be translated into an entire Europe, where differences are obviously greater beyond compare, and an attempt at a top-down and hurried obscuring of such differences would provoke reactions of a nationalistic type, which is the opposite of what is intended. These processes needs time and tact.

The position presented above may seem hardly ambitious. Yet in Europe we are in such a moment where the defence of the status quo is more important than integration and the cultural pressure to go forward which will provoke strong divisions. Today it is more important to lead Europe out of economic stagnation by ensuring growth and jobs, as without these Europeans would turn away from Europe. One needs to wait with dreams of a European federation. This, however, does not rule out the deepening of integration in smaller realms, that is, a "multi-speed Europe". More than that: one could even say that this is what one should take into account and this will predominantly concern the Eurozone. Yet beyond that, it is difficult to imagine new, narrower realms of integration.

Strong and united, or irrelevant

In as far as the programme of the Union will temporarily be "conservative" in its internal affairs – leading out of crises, improving capacity for making good decisions, defending the status quo, and avoiding disintegrating divisions – the external affairs programme must go on the offensive. The deepening of integration can wait; Europeans need to grow up to it. Yet the world will not wait for Europe. The dynamics of international change and the challenges resulting from it may push Europe to the margin. The Union is here so that this is not the case. The issue is not only the fact of the marginalisation of the EU but also the deconstruction of the current international order. We know that it is not ideal, but it is far better than the one proposed by Putin and those he would like to achieve it with.

The rise of new powers and the weakening of the position of the United States necessitate the clearly expressed operation of a powerful and united European Union on the international stage. It depends on Europeans whether we perform on that stage as Indonesia, Mexico or Argentina (that is Germany, France or Italy), or as US or China, that is as the EU. The reason why we created the Union and its Common Security and Defence Policy is not to find ourselves in the new international order ranking between India and Brazil. This must be remembered by those who just 10 or 15 years ago referred to the EU as "a global actor" and today efficiently block Europe from this role. This issue concerns Berlin, London, and Paris.

In the face of geopolitical tectonic movements on a global scale, the EU as a whole must act as a geopolitical actor rather than be satisfied with humanitarian and rescue missions in distant areas of the world that are insignificant to EU's international role. The first should be continued, but not to excuse the EU from operating in the realm of "high politics" and taking up challenges worthy of a heavyweight champion. The actual disappearance of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) proves the abdication of the EU in matters of security, especially in its own neighbourhood.

An important test for the international role of the EU lies in the question of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. This is EU's hic Rhodus, hic salta. If we cannot act efficiently in (Eastern) Europe, let's forget the Union in its capacity as "a global actor". As has been the case before, the EU is not doing well in this test, the reason being internal divisions, lack of joint geopolitical instinct in the Union, and the dependence of a significant part of the political and business elites of the EU on their interests in Russia, and their vulnerability to pressure and propaganda coming from there. Gazprom does quite well in the role of the cold war SS-20 missiles.

However, they should find a warning in the tragic death of the CEO of French Total at Moscow's Vnukovo airport. As we may remember, he was killed when a private jet on board which he was returning from a banquet hosted by Prime Minister Medvedev collided on the runway with a snow plough manned by a drunk driver. Le Monde published the news under the title "The death of a symbolic patron". If the paper's editors reflected, they would rather have written "the symbolic death of a patron". After all, the boss of Total was a very well-known opponent of sanctions against Russia (and also against other authoritarian regimes) and would go to any lengths to get around them. Only profit counted. In this sense, he fitted Lenin's definition of a capitalist... On the other hand this dramatic event should push the entire West European political and business class to reflection and conclusions. Europe's independence from Russian energy is one of the preliminary conditions for a powerful international position of the EU. The idea is not to stop purchasing raw materials from Russia, but not to toe the line of Russia's political conditions in doing so.

An excellent opportunity for a strategic awakening of the EU could be the initiation of works on a new EU security strategy. Poland has canvassed for that for a long time, and its initiation was announced by the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It "could be" if – rather than being limited to a bureaucratic and expert exercise – it became an attempt at remodelling the awareness of the member states' communities and political classes in this area. Yet everything depends on how we are going to organise it. And also, from among the leading states in the EU, Berlin opposed the new strategy. Yet Germans should remember that leadership in international life is also founded on care for the security of those you want to lead. Otherwise, security is sought elsewhere. Without doubt, the challenge that Russia has created to security in the post-cold war order in Europe must be undertaken by the EU. Joint potential is more than sufficient. What is lacking is unity, will, and strategy.