Newport: The Summit marked with important anniversaries

What most of Western politicians do as they attend anniversaries of important historic events these days is wasting their time. What I have in mind in particular is the grand commemoration ceremonies of the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, or the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain and of the overcoming of division in Europe. They do not understand much of the significance carried by those anniversaries. They do not understand the lessons learnt from those events. If they did, they would behave differently in the face of war waged by Russia against Ukraine.

Since Russia, as a successor of the Soviet Union, flagrantly breaks the most fundamental principles of the international order, instituted after those wars: WW I, WW II, and the Cold War. It violates the norms contained in the United Nations' Charter, in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Paris Charter for New Europe of the CSCE, as well as provisions and its own commitments arising from NATO-Russia Founding Act. Next to contempt of international law, it makes no effort to hide its contempt of Europe and the entire world of the West. Such an intensity of lies and chicanery in Moscow's official statements, the level of hatred and duplicity bordering on derision in their propaganda, were last time to be seen in the 1950's, i.e. in the middle age of the Soviet Union.

In response to all of it, to the Anschluss of Crimea and overtly continued aggression in Donbas, most of Western European capitals appeal for peace, urge Kiev to show moderation while fighting Russian armed separatism, recall vital economic interests which link their countries to Russia and express their hope that President Putin would get back on the right track so that partners-like relations could be restored with Russia as soon as possible. Yes, indeed, they continue to see Putin and his Russia as a close partner. The spirit and the language of appeasement is combined with the practise of burying heads in the sand: may that war be over at last, may Kiev consent to ceasefire and diplomatic talks leading to a 'peaceful' satisfaction of Moscow's claims. Many weeks' song and dance with weak sanctions imposed by the European Union, the sanctions which are even now deplored by many European politicians, copious telephone calls with polite entreaties and tentative first visits to see Putin lead him to believe that soon Europe will come to terms with the realities as they are. After all he is not going to change, nor is Russia going to change so it will be expedient to return to doing business and to partnership. They are alarmed by the very notion that such Russia should be countered with containment policy.

The stance presented by the European Union in the face of Putin's Russia's aggressive policy against Ukraine, and not only Ukraine, the policy pursued for a time not limited to recent months, is Europe's failure, a serious and ominous failure with long-term results to be expected. In the first place, Putin succeeded in breaking up Europe's unity. Even sentiments  towards war in Iraq have not divided the EU to the extent the reaction to the war in the East of the continent did.  Secondly, Putin dealt a final blow to the policy "of bringing about a change by engaging Russia" pursued by a number of important European states, lead by Germany. Russia has not changed nor has it slid into a dependency on trade contacts and on all other contacts with the West. What happened was just the opposite: the policies of Germany, Italy, Hungary or the Netherlands have been held captive of Moscow's diplomacy and Gazprom's admonitions. This is primary a mental dependency. Putin is paralysing their freedom of thought the way a snake paralyses with its glare a rabbit found in a wilderness. In the third place, Moscow's present-day conduct led to a paralysis and invalidity of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is Berlin and Paris that talk to Moscow, acting as if on behalf of the CFSP. The results are visible. But it cannot be otherwise since the capitals of Western Europe can boast a long-standing tradition of satisfying groundless claims put forward by Moscow, and this at the expense of nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In the fourth place, this is an end of dreams about Europe, about the European Union as a 'global player'. What is the point of sending expeditions to Mali or to Afghanistan if one has no courage to shape the security situation in one's direct neighbourhood, in Europe. If one does not have courage to provide arms to Ukraine: a country which is a victim of Russian aggression. Yes, it takes courage: for there is abundance of measures to be employed to make an impact. If there is no courage, there is no strategy which would allow one to put those measures to their proper use.

Germany, until recently singled out to be the EU leader, appeared to be a particular disappointment. It seems like centuries have gone by since Radoslaw Sikorski's memorable speech in Berlin in November 2011. The atavist Russophilism or understanding shown to Russia, defying loyalty to European values and standards, paired with the priority treatment accorded to mercantilism, gives the country but poor credentials for playing the leadership role. Still worse, as it has been previously noted, the attitude of German diplomacy to the fights spilling over in Donbas seems to favour Moscow plans, namely to transform that region into another Transnistria. One would like to hope that a short anniversary visit paid by Chancellor Merkel to Kiev will modify the stance that Berlin has had heretofore, if only a mite. Berlin's position on the war in Eastern Europe gives particular grounds to be concerned, it comes as a discordant note when related to the break-through which was achieved in Polish-German relations and which was attainable largely due to the right conclusions the Germans have drawn from the lessons of the past. Therefore our bilateral relations can be seen as a model, pointing to the ability that nations have to reconcile in spite of the dramas of the past. That shared experience should lay groundwork for our cooperation, also on European security.

If the EU and its main powers proved incapable of running an effective policy for security right at its borders, little wonder that the North Atlantic Alliance is coming back to its prominence as  the one who in the last decade has been standing the test, with greater or smaller success, in overseas operations beyond Article 5. The hope expressed in our region that the Alliance should embrace again its original role are all the greater now that NATO Newport Summit is forthcoming (September 4-5). Given Russia's increasing militarization, its unpredictability, its intimidation of neighbours, violation of law and contempt of previously taken commitments, the demands to adapt the Allied strategy accordingly are more than obvious. For many but not for all.

States in our region first and foremost seek to reinforce the Alliance's defence infrastructure and to secure a permanent presence of its units, small as they may be, on their territory. It is more than just an anachronism to preserve an almost unaltered situation in that respect, dating back to Cold War days. This is an anachronism that some people would like to consolidate through misinterpretation or simple ignorance of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. It must be owned that the Alliance has pledged in that political document (which does not constitute an international law agreement) that it is not going to significantly enhance its presence on the territory of new member states but only insofar as NATO security environment does not change. For a few years now, Russia's conduct, including its aggression against Ukraine, has radically modified that environment. It would be a strategic blindness or a political cowardice to ignore that fact. Moreover, Russia has violated the principles of its relations with NATO, signed in that very document, including the ban on use of force and the obligation to respect inviolability of the borders and territorial integrity of European states.

Here again, the greatest resistance against adapting the Alliance's strategy to altered security situation comes from Germany who object to the establishment of NATO permanent military presence in our region whereas the country itself hosts the largest Allied military bases in Europe. For Germany, it would be a departure from the Founding Act and a provocation levelled at Russia (i.e. an aggressor state). Such arguments do not merit serious consideration. Apparently, the prevailing view on Russia in Germany is that it should be looked on as a child with special needs who ought to be raised in a stress-free way. Europe's modern history denies such a perception.

We must acknowledge the fact that due to specific attitude that Germany has to Russia we cannot count on the former as far as regional security is concerned. That being said, we have the right to expect that Germany is not going to obstruct our pursuits of the strengthening of NATO's Eastern flank which are legitimate both due to our geopolitical experience and due to Russia's contemporary policy. It is incumbent on Germany by the reasons of history. We appreciate that time is needed so that member states may come round to it, as if was the case with NATO enlargement. This is why Newport should be seen as a beginning of the road.

What we often hear from our Western partners is that we are all in agreement as to how to assess present-day Russia and its politics and that the only point of divergence is what kind of a cure should be administered, how we should respond to the situation. This is not true. The difference that emerges is also, so to say, an ontological difference. Favourable stance on Putin's Russia, as exemplified by our Western European neighbours, has an undertone of an actually pessimistic view on the nature of Russia. For them, Russia can be only such as is its current President in office. We represent a different view. The Russians maintain their potential of becoming a normal state, also in political terms. The latter is not doomed to unpredictable authoritarianism and "soldateska" rules, a country which respects international law and the right of its neighbours to freely chose their own development path and to shape its foreign policy.

After all, it was not only Western states, led by Germany and the United States, that invested heavily in maintaining good relations with Russia in the hope that consequently Russia would modernize and would come closer to the West. This was also the intention we had in making attempts at normalization and reconciliation with our Eastern neighbour. Until recently, we could boast substantial achievements made on that road, difficult as it was in our case, bearing in mind the dramatic past in our relations. We used to believe  and we continue to believe that thanks to its opening to the West, Russia may emerge as a valuable partner for Europe.